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Theories of Embodied Semantics (ES) suggest that a critical part of understanding 
what a word means consists of simulating the sensorimotor experience related to the word’s 
referent. Some proponents of ES have suggested that sensorimotor activations are mandatory 
and highly automatic during semantic processing. Evidence supporting this claim comes from 
masked priming studies showing that unconsciously perceived spatial words (e.g. up, down) 
can directly modulate action performance on the basis of their meaning. However, a closer 
look reveals that such priming effects can be explained also in terms of symbolic 
(disembodied) semantic priming or nonsemantic mechanisms. 
In this study we sought to understand whether sensorimotor processing takes place 
during language understanding outside awareness. We used spatial words as a test-bed and 
across six experiments we teased apart the possibility that action priming could be explained 
by: (i) nonsemantic mechanisms; (ii) symbolic semantic priming; or (iii) embodied semantic 
priming. The critical finding is that when symbolic and nonsemantic mechanisms were 
prevented, allowing only for a genuinely embodied semantic priming, no effect was found. 
Conversely, facilitation emerged in the same experimental paradigm when embodied priming 
was prevented and symbolic priming was allowed. Despite extensive testing, we found no 
evidence that unconsciously perceived words can activate sensorimotor processes, although 
these words are processed up to the semantic level. We thus conclude that sensorimotor 
activations might need conscious access to emerge during language understanding. 
 





According to theories of Embodied Semantics (ES; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 
2005; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005; Barsalou, 
2008) word meaning is based, at least in part, on sensorimotor representations. Understanding 
a word requires the activation of sensorial (e.g. visual, auditory, tactile) and motor 
representations that are usually associated with the perceptual and/or motor experience of the 
word’s referent (Glenberg & Gallese, 2012). For instance, understanding the word “grasp” 
will require the activation of the perceptual and motor system that is usually active when 
someone performs (or sees someone else performing) the action of grasping. A general 
assumption of ES is that thinking, acting and perceiving are based on (partly) shared neural 
structures. 
ES is usually contrasted with more traditional “disembodied” theories of semantics, 
which hold that word meaning is symbolically represented by activating concepts stored in a 
modality-independent fashion (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). 
Although disembodied theories differ from each other (see Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & 
Vigliocco, 2012 for a review), they share the hypothesis that perception and action on the one 
hand and word’s semantics on the other are subserved by different neurocognitive structures. 
Accordingly, the sensorimotor system is not needed to understand the meaning of words. At 
most, the involvement of sensorimotor activations during language comprehension is 
considered the product of post-semantic processing via indirect routes, such as the activation 
of working memory processes that may involve sensorimotor areas (Meteyard et al. 2012). 
The fact that sensorimotor information can activate during language understanding is 
well established, both in the behavioral and in the neuroimaging literature. For instance, 
several behavioral experiments have shown that semantic processing can modulate action 
execution and perception (Boulanger, Roy, Paulignan, Deprez, Jannerod, & Nazir, 2006; 
Glemberg, Sato, & Cattaneo, 2008; Glemberg & Kaschak, 2002). Indeed, simply reading a 
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word can activate sensorimotor brain areas specifically related to the meaning of that word 
(e.g. the premotor cortex for “grasp”, auditory areas for “doorbell”; Willems, Hagoort, & 
Casasanto, 2010; Kiefer, Trumpp, Herrnberger, Sim, Hoening, & Pulvermuller, 2012). 
Advocates of a strong version of ES suggest that the involvement of the sensorimotor system 
in semantic processing is highly automatic (Boulanger et al., 2006; Pülvermuller, Hauk, 
Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005) and necessary (Ansorge, Kiefer, Khalid, Grassl, & König, 
2010). To date, the best evidence for this claim comes from masked priming experiments 
suggesting that sensorimotor representations are activated even when words are processed 
outside of consciousness (Ansorge et al. 2010; Boulanger, Silber, Roy, Paulignan, Jannerod, 
& Nazir, 2008; Dudshig, de la Vega, De Filippis & Kaup, 2014). 
It is well established that words can be processed up to the semantic level even when 
unconsciously perceived, at least in some cases (deWitt & Kinoshita, 2014; Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001; Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008; see Kouider & Dehaene, 2007 for a review). One 
of the most fruitful paradigms used in psycholinguistics to investigate unconscious 
processing in language understanding is masked priming (Evett & Humphreys, 1981; Forster 
& Davis, 1984). In a typical masked priming experiment, a prime is presented briefly, 
sandwiched between a forward mask and a backward mask (e.g. AFNBGTYHDR) before the 
appearance of a target. In the majority of the cases, participants are not aware of the presence 
of the prime, and this lack of awareness precludes the possibility that they could intentionally 
elaborate the word meaning (Forster & Davis, 1984; Forster, 1998). Nevertheless, the prime 
word does influence participants’ responses, at least in some circumstances. For instance, 
people are typically faster in classifying the target if prime and target are from the same 
semantic category (e.g. Mars and Venus, which are both tokens of the category PLANETS), 
compared to when prime and target are unrelated (e.g. Mars and Crocodile; Quinn & 
Kinoshita, 2008). Unconscious semantic priming has been obtained with a number of 
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different types of stimuli and experimental designs, but all these effects were traced back to 
one of four different mechanisms. 
The classic account in the psycholinguistic literature attributes semantic priming to 
some intrinsic relationship between the semantic representations of the prime and the target 
words. Semantically related words are considered as closely interconnected nodes in a 
semantic network (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), so that that seeing the prime makes it 
easier to process a related target due to spreading activation from one node to nearby nodes 
(e.g., Bueno & Franck–Mestre, 2002; Lupker, 1984; McRea & Boisvert, 1998). In the 
Spreading Activation account sensorimotor information is not considered a fundamental part 
of semantic representations. 
A different type of symbolic account of semantic masked priming was recently 
proposed by deWitt and Kinoshita (2014a, 2014b), and is based on Evidence Accumulation 
and Source Confusion. This proposal holds that word recognition is a process of evidence 
accumulation for a hypothesis dictated by the task (Norris & Kinoshita, 2008). For instance, 
in a semantic classification task, participants are engaged in collecting relevant information 
(evidence) in order to make a semantic decision (e.g., accept or reject the hypothesis that the 
target word refers to an animal). The close temporal proximity of prime and target leads to 
source confusion, and the evidence accumulated via the prime is used to validate the 
hypothesis over the target. According to this mechanism, it is the decision required by the 
task that drives the priming effect (deWitt & Kinoshita, 2014b). This may hold in paradigms 
where primes and targets have some form of semantic relationship, e.g., belong to the same, 
task–relevant category. For example, when people are asked to decide whether the target 
word is a planet, seeing Venus as a prime provides evidence for a YES response, thus making 
easier to address the target word Mars (Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008). Critically, however, 
primes and targets do not necessarily have to be related in order for priming to emerge. For 
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example, in a task where people have to make an upward movement when they see a blue 
spot and downward movement when they see a red one, seeing spatial words as primes (e.g., 
up, sky, vs. down, ground) would provide evidence for either an upward or a downward 
response (e.g., Dudschig, de la Vega, De Filippis, & Kaup, 2014). Thus, a priming effect can 
be observed also when prime and target are unrelated. This is different from the Spreading 
Activation account, where priming is entirely attributed to primes-target relationships, 
independently of task requirements (deWitt & Kinoshita, 2014b). Like in the Spreading 
Activation account, there is no particular role for motor or perceptual representations in the 
Evidence Accumulation account. 
According to the Stimulus-Response Mapping mechanisms, the prime can induce 
facilitation by directly activating the response action required by the target (e.g., pressing a 
left or right key), by virtue of some short–term, ad–hoc association created by the task. This 
mechanism is likely to take place when the same words are used both as targets and primes 
(Damian, 2001), and a small set of stimuli is repeated many times in the course of the 
experiment. Under these conditions, target words become quickly associated with their 
corresponding response action. For instance, in an experiment where participants have to 
classify words as pleasant or unpleasant, the target word love would become associated with 
the button for the pleasant response and the target word death would become associated with 
the button for the unpleasant response. If these same targets are then shown as primes, they 
may boost their corresponding responses by virtue of these associations, thus making 
congruent trials (e.g., love–FLOWER) quicker than incongruent trials (e.g., death–FLOWER). 
Contrary to the two previous mechanisms, this mechanism does not necessarily require that 
the prime is processed up the semantic level (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; 
Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). The non-semantic nature of this mechanism has been clearly 
demonstrated by Abrams & Greenwald (2000). In their experiment, after the target words 
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smut and bile were repeatedly classified as unpleasant during the task, the subliminally 
presented word smile (which is composed of fragments of the words smut and bile) facilitated 
unpleasant responses, instead of pleasant ones. On the opposite side, tumor facilitated 
pleasant responses after that the words tulip and humor were repeatedly presented as target. It 
was the learned association between (fragments of) the target words and the response action, 
instead of the semantic value of the primes that was driving the priming effect. 
The fourth mechanism is Embodied Priming (Ansorge et al. 2010; Boulanger et al. 
2008; Dudschig et al. 2014). Similar to the Stimulus-Response Mapping mechanisms, the 
unconscious prime can facilitate or inhibit the response action required by the task. Yet, the 
effect is due to the long-term meaning of the prime word and not to the short-term association 
between that word and a particular response during the task. For instance, when a prime word 
like up is processed unconsciously, congruent sensorimotor representations are automatically 
activated (e.g., motor programs for upward movements) so that a congruent response 
movement, such as pressing an upward located key, will be facilitated compared to an 
incongruent one.  In this case the priming effect can take place independently of the 
semantics of the target word as long as the response action required by the task is 
semantically related to the prime. Such a priming mechanism would provide support for 
strong theories of embodied semantics because it would indicate that meaning activates motor 
programs outside awareness and very early during word identification  
Embodied Priming has been claimed in a number of studies (Ansorge et al. 2010; 
Boulanger et al. 2008; Dudschig et al. 2014), whose results, however, seem to be open to 
alternative interpretations upon a closer look. Ansorge and colleagues (2010), for instance, 
tested embodied semantics using a masked priming paradigm with directional words referring 
to the vertical axis (e.g. up, above, down, below). In their Experiment 1 participants had to 
classify target words as referring to upper or lower spatial positions by pressing keys that 
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were physically located in the upper and lower part of space, respectively. Although the same 
set of spatial words appeared both as primes and targets, the prime and target were never the 
same word in a given trial. Participants were faster in congruent trials (e.g., up and above) 
compared to incongruent ones (e.g., up and below). The authors attributed the priming effect 
to embodied mechanisms according to which spatial primes automatically activated response 
actions (moving upward/downward) on the basis of their meaning: When the motor program 
activated by prime and target was congruent (e.g. up-above) responses were faster compared 
to incongruent trials (up-below). Yet, priming effect in this case can also be explained in 
terms of nonsemantic stimulus-response mapping (since the same words are used as prime 
and targets) or symbolic mechanisms (unconscious primes facilitate the processing of related 
target words). A disembodied account was indeed supported in their Experiment 2, where 
they assigned participants a non-canonical response code: Subjects had to press the upper key 
for words such as below or down, and the lower key for words such above and up. Results 
showed that upward primes (e.g., up) facilitated responses to upward targets (e.g., above), 
and therefore downward movements. Similarly, downward primes facilitated downward 
targets even though they were associated with upward movements. This pattern of results 
clearly favors disembodied mechanisms, since the priming effect is independent from the 
action response associated with words. Notably, the priming effect with a canonical mapping 
was smaller than the priming effect with a non–canonical mapping. Ansorge and colleagues 
took this difference to mean that at least part of the facilitation seen with canonical mappings 
was due to Embodied Priming. According to them, neither symbolic mechanisms nor 
stimulus–response mappings would predict any difference between canonical and non–
canonical mappings. However, this is questionable. From a Stimulus-Response Mapping 
perspective, participants facing a non–canonical mapping may have had to suppress the 
activation of the canonical mapping in order to follow the instructions and perform the 
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experiment correctly; and this may well have caused weaker priming. This hypothesis is 
supported by the overall higher RTs in Experiment 2 (with non canonical mapping) compared 
to Experiment 1 (with canonical mapping; ~840 ms vs. ~736 ms). Clearly, there is no 
embodiment in this account of Ansorge et al.’s results. 
Using a mouse-tracking paradigm, Tower-Richardi and colleagues (Tower-Richardi, 
Brunyé, Gagnon, Mahoney& Taylor, 2012) asked participants to move a computer mouse 
toward a left, right, up or down location on the screen following a target directional word 
(e.g. up) or an arrow. Movement trajectories were influenced by masked spatial primes 
denoting absolute spatial coordinates (i.e. east, north, west, south). Although this experiment 
shows nicely that absolute and relative spatial coordinates are associated to each other in our 
mind, the priming effect it is not necessarily due to unconsciously activated motor programs. 
Evidence Accumulation and Source Confusion can also explain the effect, with the spatial 
primes providing evidence for making the task dictated decision of moving up, down, left or 
right. Moreover no objective measure of prime visibility (e.g. d-prime) is provided in this 
paper. 
Another paper that seems to support embodiment outside of awareness is Trumpp, 
Traub and Kiefer (2013). In an ERP experiment, participants were asked to silently read 
action–related words (e.g., typewriter) or sound–related words (e.g., banjo), which were 
preceded by the masked presentation of primes that could be either in the same semantic 
category (typewriter preceded by hammer, banjo preceded by thunder) or not (typewriter 
preceded by streetlight, banjo preceded by cradle). The authors report priming effects 
between 100 and 180ms after target presentation, showing a reduction of target-related 
activity with different topography and partially different neural source depending on the 
target category (sound, action). Although the authors concluded that sensorimotor features 
were thus activated unconsciously, it is also possible that the modulatory effect took place at 
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the symbolic semantic level when words were unconsciously perceived and then cascaded 
down to modulate sensorimotor activation due to the conscious processing of the target 
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Although these results may support sensorimotor activity due 
to conscious language processing, they cannot be taken as evidence for unconscious 
embodied semantics. 
Although other masked priming studies have been interpreted in favor of ES 
(Boulenger et al. 2008; Dudschig et al.2014), the results tell a partially different story. For 
instance, in the study by Dudschig and colleagues (Dudschig et al. 2014) participants had to 
categorize visible colored rectangles by moving toward and pressing either an upper or a 
lower key. Targets were preceded by masked words referring to objects with a canonical 
spatial position (e.g. hat or foot). Any priming here could not be attributed to short–term 
association between primes and responses because primes were never seen as targets. A 
purely symbolic account based on simple spreading activation is also untenable, because hats 
and feet are not semantically related with specific colors. Priming may be expected, however, 
according to the embodied interpretation of Ansorge et al.’s (2010) findings—words like hat 
and nest should make upward movements faster, and words like feet and ground should 
prime downward movements. (Interestingly, this is what emerges in studies where the 
priming word is overtly presented to the participants, e.g., Lachmair, Dudschig, De Filippis, 
de la Vega, & Kaup, 2011). However, the opposite was found: Upward movements were 
slower after up-related primes, and downward movements were slower after down-related 
primes. Although the authors interpret these data in embodied terms anyway, it is clear that it 
is very difficult to reconcile these results with the evidence provided by Ansorge et al. 
(2010).  
A similar instance of inhibitory priming was reported previously in a study by 
Boulanger and colleagues (Boulanger, Silber, Roy, Paulignan, Jeannerod, & Nazir, 2008). 
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Unconsciously perceived action words produced a diminished lateralized action potential and 
slower wrist acceleration during a grasping task, compared to nouns not associated with 
action. The authors suggested that the interference was due to competition for common 
cortical resources between semantic processing and action preparation and execution (see 
also Boulanger et al. 2006). Nevertheless, Boulanger and colleagues found that sequences of 
consonants (designed to be the control condition) interfered with action execution as well as 
action verbs, suggesting that negative priming might be due to non-semantic aspects of the 
primes.  
To sum up, there are experiments in the literature claiming support to strong theories 
of ES based on masked semantic priming that are interpreted in embodied terms: 
Unconsciously perceived words automatically activate sensorimotor processes related to their 
long-term meaning. However, upon closer examination, these findings can also be explained 
by non-embodied accounts, and provide data that are at least partially inconsistent. This paper 
aims to address these issues, thus clarifying the nature of semantic masked priming triggered 
by spatial words.  
In six experiments we progressively excluded the possibility that action modulation 
by subliminal words could be explained by (i) short-term stimulus-response associations, (ii) 
symbolic relationships between prime and targets or (iii) the Evidence Accumulation 
mechanism. To preview our results, we found a positive priming effect only when at least one 
of these non-embodied priming mechanisms could take place. Conversely, we showed that 
when the possibility of symbolic priming is prevented, allowing only for a genuinely 
embodied effect, neither facilitation nor inhibition is observed. Importantly, in the same 
experimental paradigm, when embodied priming is prevented and symbolic priming is 





This experiment is a close replication of Ansorge et al. (2010) Experiment 1. 
Participants saw spatial words and had to classify them according to a canonical response 
mapping: They had to press the higher key if the word referred to the higher part of space 
(e.g., above) or press the lower response key if the word referred to the lower part of space 
(e.g., below), on a vertically oriented response pad. Target words were always preceded by a 
masked prime that was also a spatial word, either congruent (above–up) or incongruent 
(below–up). Each word appeared as both a target and a prime, but not in the same trial. Under 
these conditions, priming may be due to (i) symbolic priming based on Spreading Activation, 
(ii) symbolic priming based on Evidence Accumulation and Source Confusion, (iii) stimulus-
response mapping, (iv) embodied priming, (v) or a combination of all these mechanisms. This 
experiment serves three purposes: (a) setting a baseline from which we can progressively rule 
out the four candidate mechanisms above; (b) ensure that masked semantic priming based on 
spatial words can be obtained in Italian, and (c) ensure that our experimental settings at 
Milano Bicocca do not justify possible differences between our results and those of Ansorge 
et al. (2010).  
 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-four university students at Milano Bicocca (18F, mean age=25 years) 
were recruited for this study. They all reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no 
neurological or reading problems, and were native Italian speakers. Participants were paid 8 
euros or given course credits in exchange for their time. 
 
Stimuli. Prime and target stimuli were 8 Italian spatial words referring to position (or change 
in position) on the vertical axis: su (up), giù (down), sopra (above), sotto (below), salita 
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(ascent), discesa (descent), alto (high), and basso (low). Upward and downward words were 
matched for number of syllables and frequency of occurrence (4.98 ± .91 vs. 4.77 ± .84; data 
are taken from SUTBLEX–IT, Crepaldi, Amenta, Mandera, Keuleers, & Brysbaert, 2015, and 
are expressed in Zipf units, Van Heuven, Mandera, Keuleers, & Brysbaert, 2014). Each of the 
eight words was presented as a target, preceded by one of the other seven words as a prime—
there was no pair where the prime and the target were identical. Half of the pairs were 
semantically congruent, i.e., primes and targets referred to the same part of space (e.g., su–
alto, up–high), whereas half were incongruent, i.e., primes and targets referred to different 
parts of space (e.g., giù–alto, down–high). 
 
Apparatus and procedure. Participants performed first a word categorization task on the 
target words (the experimental task proper), and then, immediately after, a prime visibility 
task. 
In the categorization task, participants were asked to judge whether spatial words 
referred to the upper/lower part of space, and to press one of two vertically–arranged buttons 
accordingly, i.e., the upper button for upward words, and the lower button for downward 
words. Instructions always referred to the keys in terms of their color (green or red; 
counterbalanced across subjects) and never in terms of spatial coordinates (e.g. upper/lower 
key). Participants were told that a fixation point would appear first, followed by a random 
string of uppercase letters to announce the appearance of the target word, which would be 
shown lowercase. No mention was made about the presence of a prime word.  
The trial timeline is illustrated in Figure 1. A fixation cross was displayed for 750 ms, 
followed by a forward mask, which consisted of 10 random uppercase letters and stayed on 
the screen for 200ms. This first mask was immediately followed by the prime word, shown in 
lowercase letters for 33ms (four screen refreshes at 120 Hz). The prime was followed by a 
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backward mask (33ms), identical to the previous one, and finally by the target word, which 
remained on the screen until the participants produced a response. Participants received 
negative feedback (the screen turned red) if their answer was wrong or if their RT exceeded 
1250 ms. 
The experiment consisted of 480 trials. Before starting with the experiment, each 
participant received a practice block of 32 trials. Trials were uniquely randomized for each 
participant, and were divided into six blocks, between which participants took a one–minute 
break. This part of the experiment lasted approximately 25 minutes overall. 
After participants had finished the experimental task, they were asked whether they 
noticed a word being presented just before the target appeared. Participants were then 
informed about the presence of a prime, and the prime visibility task started. This consisted 
of 160 trials, whose timeline was identical to that of the experimental trials. However, 
participants were now asked to focus on the prime word. In order to make sure they knew 
where the prime was within the trials, before starting the task participants were shown two 
examples where the prime duration was tripled (100ms), so that the prime became fully 
visible. Participants engaged in one of the three prime identification tasks, assessing prime 
identification at three different levels of processing (Ansorge et al., 2010). Eight participants 
just did the experimental task on the primes, i.e., were asked to classify the prime words by 
pressing the upper key for upward primes and the lower key for downward primes. Another 
eight participants were asked to decide whether primes and targets were spatially congruent, 
i.e., they referred to the same part of space. A final third of the participants were asked to 
decide whether the prime was a real word vs. a string of identical uppercase letters (e.g., 
GGGGGGG). Instructions always referred to the keys in terms of their color (green or red) 
and never in terms of spatial coordinates (e.g. upper/lower key). This was true for all three 
versions of the prime-visibility test. 
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No feedback on either response times or error rates was provided and participants 
could take all the time they needed to give a response. Each participant performed a practice 
block of 16 trials before engaging in the prime visibility task. On average, the prime visibility 
block lasted approximately eight minutes.  
Participants were tested individually, seated at a distance of approximately 57 cm 
from the monitor in a dimly lit room, and used headphones to block any outside noise. The 
head was supported by a chin-rest in order to ensure a constant viewing distance and a 
forward-leaning posture. All stimuli were presented at the center on a 27–inch ACER monitor 
with a refresh rate of 120 Hz, and were displayed in light gray on a black background. The 
display of the stimuli and the collection of the responses were controlled by Matlab 
(Mathworks, Naticks, MA), using Psychtoolbox functions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
Response times were collected through a custom–made response box placed in front 
of the subject. The response box was equipped with three buttons, arranged vertically. 
Participants were asked to press the central button in order to initiate the trials, and to keep it 
pressed until they were ready to offer a response, i.e., move towards either the upper or the 
lower button. The upper and lower buttons were equally distant from the central one, and 
were marked with colors (red and green). In order to exclude any color influence, the 
orientation of the colored buttons was counterbalanced between participants such that the 
green button was on the bottom for half of the participants and on the top for the other half of 
participants. 
 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
 
Results 
Target-response task. Inaccurate trials (less than 1%) were excluded from the RTs analysis. 
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Trials for which the RT was above 1250ms, so that the subject received an error feedback 
(3%) were also considered as errors and excluded from the analysis. In order to reduce the 
effect of extremely long and short RTs, those individual datapoints standing at more than 2 
standard deviations from each participant’s mean (~5% of the correct trials) were also 
removed from the analyses (like Ansorge et al. 2010). The overall mean response time was 
704 ms. 
A 2–by–2 ANOVA on the log-transformed RTs revealed a significant main effect of 
Congruity, F(1, 23)= 42.49, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.649. The responses in the congruent condition 
were faster (mean RT= 695ms) than in the incongruent condition (mean RT= 714ms). The 
factor Congruity interacted with Movement Direction, F(1, 23)= 5.04, p= 0.04, η2 = 0.18, 
indicating that the congruity effect was slightly greater for downward compared to upward 
movements. Critically, however, the congruity effect was significant with both downward 
and upward movements (Downward: 22ms, F(1, 23)= 35.54, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.61; Upward: 
16ms, F(1, 23)= 32.04, p< 0.001, η2= 0.58). The main effect of Movement Direction did not 
reach significance, F(1, 23)= 0.56, p= 0.46, η2 = 0.024. No effect emerged in the error rate 
analyses. 
 
Prime visibility task. No participants reported having noticed the prime during the 
experimental task. From the performance in the prime visibility task we computed individual 
d-prime values as an index of prime perceptibility (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Hits and 
False Alarms were defined accordingly to the task requirements, that is, differently for each 
of the three prime visibility tasks. The average d-prime value was very low overall (mean= 
0.04, SD= 0.27), and it was not significantly different from zero (t(23)= 0.68, p= 0.5). The 
average d-prime values were comparable across prime visibility tests (semantic judgment= - 
0.03; congruity judgment= 0.12; letter judgment= 0.01; F(2,21)= 0.12, p= 0.89). Overall, d-
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prime values and priming effects were not correlated (r = 0.13; t(22)= 0.63, p= 0.53). 
 
Discussion 
Our results fully replicated those of Ansorge et al.’s (2010) experiment 1—upward 
primes facilitated responses to upward targets with upward movements, and downward 
primes facilitated responses to downward targets with downward movements. This: (i) shows 
that Italian spatial words can yield masked priming effects as their German counterparts do; 
(ii) shows that Ansorge et al.’s effect can be replicated with our specific experimental 
settings, so that an eventual lack of priming in following experiments could not be attributed 
to this factor; and (iii) sets the baseline for further exploration into what mechanism generates 
the effect.  
We started by tackling the Stimulus-Response Mapping account, which was made 
viable, in our first Experiment, by the fact that prime words were also used as targets. In 
Experiment 2, we used non–overlapping sets of prime and target words so that we excluded 
any possibility of a task–induced, stimulus–response mapping. If a congruity effect is found, 
then at least part of the priming effect observed in Experiment 1 was due to semantic 
mechanisms. If, instead, the semantic congruity effect fades away, then the mechanism that 





Participants. Twenty-four new participants (five males and 19 females, mean age: 23 years) 
took part in Experiment 2. Participants were paid with 8 Euros or given course credits in 




Stimuli. Prime and target stimuli were the same Italian spatial words used in Experiment 1. 
However, they were now divided into two distinguished lists, so that su (up), giù (down), 
sopra (above), sotto (below) were only used as primes, and salita (ascent), discesa (descent), 
alto (high), and basso (low) were only used as targets. 
 
Apparatus and Procedure were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Results 
Target-response task. Two participants were excluded from the analyses, one because of a 
failure with the experimental apparatus and one because s/he didn’t comply with the 
experimental requirements (s/he always pressed the yes key during the prime visibility task). 
After the exclusion of these participants, data were pre–processed exactly as in Experiment 1, 
which resulted in the exclusion of ~9% of trials. The overall mean response time was 681ms.
  
A 2–by–2 ANOVA on logarithmically-transformed RTs revealed no main effect of 
Congruity, F(1, 21)= 1.22, p= 0.28,	η2 = 0.05, no effect of Movement Direction, F(1, 21)= 
2.02, p= 0.17,	η2 = 0.09, and no interaction between the two, F(1, 21)= 2.97, p= 0.1,	η2 = 
0.12. The average response times in the congruent condition and in the incongruent condition 
were 680ms and 682ms, respectively. No effect emerged in the error rate analyses. 
A Mixed ANOVA with Congruity as a within-subjects factor and Experiment (Exp.1, 
Exp.2) as a between-subjects factor substantiated the observation that the priming effect was 
stronger in Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2 (F(1, 44)= 23.90, p< 0.001,	η2 = 0.35). 
 
Prime visibility task. No participant reported having noticed the prime, just as in Experiment 
EMBODIED	SEMANTIC	PRIMING	 	 19	
	
1. The average d-prime value was very low (0.03, SD=0.21), and not significantly different 
from zero (t(21)= 0.66, p= 0.52). Average d-prime values were comparable across prime 
visibility tests (Semantic judgment= 0.07; Congruity judgment= -0.1; Letter judgment= 0.13; 
F(2,19)= 1.30, p= 0.3). D-prime values and priming effects were not correlated (r= 0.27; 
t(20)= 1.29, p= 0.21). 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 show that no priming effect emerges with spatial words 
when non-semantic stimulus-response mapping is prevented by using different sets of primes 
and targets (see Damian 2001; Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; for similar results). This supports 
the hypothesis that the priming effect observed in our Experiment 1 was almost entirely due 
to stimulus-response associations, and was therefore not semantic in nature.  
Although these results may cast doubts about the presence of a genuine semantic 
priming (embodied or disembodied) in Experiment 1 (and, arguably, in the Ansorge et al. 
Experiments), it does not rule out the possibility that unconscious semantic priming can take 
place under different conditions.  The absence of semantic priming could be due to the fact 
that the duration of the prime display was too short to allow the appropriate semantic 
processing for the majority of the subjects, resulting in a weak and instable effect (Draine & 
Greenwald, 1998; Grainger, Diependaele, Spinelli, Ferrand, & Farioli, 2003; Greenwald, 
Draine & Abrams, 1996). In Experiment 3 we increased the duration of the prime display 
from 33ms to 50ms, so as to see whether a slightly longer presentation time allows for 
symbolic and/or embodied priming to emerge, while remaining outside awareness. A prime 
duration of ~50 ms has been used in several masked priming experiments (e.g. Quinn & 
Kinoshita, 2008; deWit & Kinoshita, 2014b; Grainger, Diependaele, Spinelli, Ferrand, & 
Farioli, 2003) and allows for robust semantic priming by keeping the prime invisible for the 
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large majority of participants. Like in Experiment 2, separate sets of primes and targets were 




Participants. A new set of 24 students at the University of Milano Bicocca were recruited in 
this experiment. Sixteen were females, and their mean age was 23 years. All participants 
reported no neurological problems, normal or corrected–to–normal vision, and were native 
Italian speakers.  
Stimuli, Apparatus and Procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 2, with the 
only exception that primes were shown for 50ms, followed by a 50ms backward mask. 
 
Results 
Target-response task. The overall accuracy rate was ~99%. Data were prepared for the 
analysis as in Experiment 1 and 2, which excluded ~8% of trials. The overall mean response 
time was 685ms. A 2–by–2 ANOVA over RTs logarithms revealed a main effect of 
Congruity (F (1,23) = 33.03, p < 0.001, η2= 0.59, Figure 2). In the congruent condition 
participants were faster (mean RT= 677ms) than in the incongruent condition (mean RT= 
693ms). There was also a main effect of Movement Direction, F (1,23)= 5.44, p= 0.03, η2= 
0.19, indicating faster response movements in the upward direction irrespective of the prime. 
The Congruity by Movement Direction interaction was not significant, F (1,23)= 0.43, p= 
0.52, η2= 0.02. 
An ANOVA on the arc-sine transformed error rates revealed a main effect of 
Congruity, F(1, 23)= 6.57, p= 0.02, η2= 0.22, indicating that participants were more accurate 
in congruent trials compared to incongruent ones (99.4% vs. 99.0%). There was no effect of 
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Movement Direction, F(1, 23)= 0.03, p= 0.85, η2 = 0.001, and no interaction between the 
predictors, F(1, 23)= 0.08, p= 0.78, η2 = 0.003. 
A Mixed ANOVA with Congruity as a within–subjects factor and Experiment (Exp. 
2, Exp. 3) as a between–subjects factor proved that the priming effect was stronger in 
Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 2 (F(1, 44)= 17.81, p< 0.001,	η2 = 0.29). 
 
Prime visibility task. One participant reported noticing the presence of a prime 
during the target–response task, at least on a few trials; the other 23 reported being 
completely unaware of it. Overall, the average d-prime value was 0.43 (SD= 0.80). Although 
significantly different from zero, t(23)= 2.62, p= 0.01, this value is widely taken to indicate 
that the prime was effectively masked from perceivers’ awareness (e.g., Kouider & Dupoux, 
2005). Average d-prime values were comparable across prime visibility tests (Semantic 
judgment= 0.48; Congruity judgment= 0.23; Letter judgment = 0.58; F(2,21) = 0.75, p= 
0.48). Priming effect and d-prime values correlated significantly (r=.50; t(22)= 2.71, p= 
0.01).  
In order to rule out the possibility that prime visibility was the main driver of the 
priming effect, we also analyzed the data using the Greenwald regression method 
(Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995). As illustrated in Figure 2, we regressed priming 
against d–prime, both averaged by participants. Facilitation is considered to happen outside 
awareness when the 95% Confidence Interval (CI) of the regression line at the origin lies 
entirely above the x axis, i.e., priming is estimated to be significantly higher than zero when 
d–prime is 0. This is exactly what we found in the data of Experiment 3. 
 





A significant priming effect emerged in Experiment 3, with congruent prime-target 
pairs (e.g., up–high) being processed faster than incongruent ones (e.g., down–high). This 
shows that masked priming with spatial words can take place even when non-semantic 
stimulus-response mapping is prevented (prime words never appeared as targets), provided 
that prime duration is slightly increased as compared to previous experiments (50ms, in this 
specific case). Importantly, despite primes being shown for slightly longer than in 
experiments 1 and 2, they were reliably kept outside participants’ awareness.  
Much previous work has shown that longer presentation times for the primes 
generally yield more solid semantic priming effects (e.g., Holcomb, Reder, Misra, & 
Grainger, 2005), and our results sit well with this literature. Some of this research also 
focused on the time elapsed between the presentation of the prime and the appearance of the 
target word, the so–called Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA; e.g., Holcomb & Grainger, 
2009), which can be varied independently from the duration of the prime (varying the display 
time of the backward mask). In this case, results are less consistent, with longer SOA yielding 
weaker priming effects at least in some cases (Holcomb & Grainger, 2007). Our data cannot 
distinguish which of these factors is really driving the effect, since SOA and prime duration 
covary in this experiment. Note, however, that this does not affect at all the core issue of this 
work—we were only interested in SOA/prime presentation time insofar as they allowed 
semantic priming to emerge, so that we can study whether this effect is embodied or symbolic 
in nature. 
Coming back to the central issue of the paper, Experiment 3 demonstrates that spatial 
words yield masked priming that is genuinely semantic in nature. We still do not know, 
however, whether this is due to a symbolic relationship in semantic memory between prime 
and target words; or to the fact that task–relevant information is mistakenly taken up from the 
EMBODIED	SEMANTIC	PRIMING	 	 23	
	
primes to guide the task-dictated decision; or, again, to an embodied mechanism whereby 
seeing, e.g., up, although briefly and outside awareness, pre–activates upward movements.  
There is one feature of the spreading activation account that differentiates it from the 
other two: primes and targets need to have related meanings, as priming is impossible 
otherwise. This is the rationale of Experiment 4, where we made use of target words (e.g. car, 
boat) that are totally unrelated to the spatial primes, yet maintain a spatially oriented response 
(upward/downward movement). If a priming effect emerges (e.g. upward primes facilitates 
upward movements), it cannot be due to the symbolic relationship between prime and target. 
This would rule out the Spreading Activation account and implicate the Evidence 
Accumulation account and/or the Embodied Priming account in the semantic priming effect 




Participants. Twenty-six participants were recruited in this experiment, none of which had 
participated in the previous ones. Fifteen were females, and their mean age was 25. They all 
reported no neurological and/or reading problems, normal or corrected–to–normal vision, and 
were native Italian speakers. Participants were paid 8 Euros or given course credits in 
exchange for their time. 
 
Stimuli. The primes were the same Italian spatial words used in previous experiments. They 
were divided into two groups of four, each including two downward and two upward words, 
which were rotated across participants in a Latin square design, i.e., half of the participants 
saw one group of prime words, half saw the other. We adopted this design in order to make 
sure that, overall, exactly the same prime words that were used in Experiment 3 were also 
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used here. Also, this design guarantees that each participant is shown four different prime 
words during the experiment, which, again, is identical to what happened in Experiment 3. 
Targets were four words that refer to either water or ground transportation means, i.e., auto 
(car), treno (train), nave (ship), and barca (boat). 
 
Apparatus and procedure. In the target–response task, participants were required to judge 
whether the target word represented a water or a ground transportation mean, and press a 
colored response button accordingly (red for water transportation and green for ground 
transportation, or vice versa). As in previous experiments, buttons were arranged vertically, 
so that participants had to respond with either an upward or a downward movement. 
Congruent trials were trials in which the spatial prime (e.g. “above”) corresponded to the 
required response movement (e.g. upward movement). Color position was rotated across 
participants, so that half of them had the red button below the starting hand position, and half 
had it above the starting hand position. 
Given the structure of prime-target pairs in this experiment, the prime-visibility task 
in which the participants had to judge if the prime-target pairs were semantically congruent or 
incongruent was eliminated. Because no difference between the three prime visibility tasks 
emerged in previous experiments, this should not be matter of concern. Every other aspect of 
the experiment, including the trial timeline, the overall trial number, and the response box, 
was identical to the previous experiments. 
 
Results 
Target-response task. One participant could not perform the target-response task and one 
always responded no in the prime visibility task. Data from these subjects were not 
considered in the analysis. The average accuracy rate was ~99%. Data were pre–processed as 
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in previous experiments, which resulted in the exclusion of ~9% of trials. The overall mean 
response time was 732 ms. 
Response times were analyzed through a mixed ANOVA with Congruity (prime 
congruent with movement vs. prime incongruent with movement) and Response Code 
(ground transportation assigned to the upper key vs. ground transportation assigned to the 
lower key) as predictors. The Response Code factor was included in the analysis only as a 
way to check that the position assigned to each category did not affect the data. There was a 
main effect of Congruity, F(1,23)= 8.75, p= .007, η2= 0.28 (Figure 3). Participants were 
faster in the congruent condition (RTs= 729ms) than in the incongruent condition (RTs= 
735ms). There was no effect of Response Code, F(1,23)= 0.08, p= .78, η2= 0.004, and no 
Congruity by Response Code interaction, F(1,23)= 0.01, p= .93, η2=<0.01, showing that the 
priming effect was unaffected by the particular association between transportation mean and 
vertical part of space. No effect emerged in the error rate analyses. 
 
Prime visibility task. None of the participants reported having noticed the primes. As in the 
previous experiment, average d-prime was low (0.42, SD= 0.88), although significantly 
different from zero (t(23)= 2.35, p= .03). Average d-prime values were comparable across 
prime visibility tests (Semantic judgment= 0.49; Letter judgment = 0.35; t(22)= 0.36, p= 
0.71). Again similar to Experiment 3, the Greenwald regression method shows that the 
intercept of the d prime–priming effect regression line was significantly above the origin, 
suggesting a truly subliminal effect (see Figure 3). Priming effect and d-prime values were 
not correlated (r= -0.22; t(22)= -1.08, p= 0.29). 
 






In this experiment targets were not semantically related with the spatial primes, which 
ruled out the possibility of masked priming based on simple spreading activation. 
Nevertheless reliable facilitation emerged.  
Two mechanisms are left to explain the results of Experiment 4. Spatial primes could 
have directly influenced response movements as predicted by the embodied account—seeing 
“up” would make people faster in making upward movements. It is interesting to note that, 
although these data can be interpreted as consistent with embodied semantics, they are at 
odds with those reported by Dudschig et al. (2014), who used a similar paradigm: We found a 
facilitation effect, whereas these authors reported negative priming, that is, incongruent 
prime-response pairs led to faster RTs compared to congruent ones. Although Experiment 4 
is different in many regards from Dudschig et al. experiment (e.g., different primes, different 
targets, longer prime duration, unimanual responses), the reasons of these opposite results are 
not clear. We will come back to this issue in the General Discussion. 
Evidence Accumulation and Source Confusion can also account for the results of 
Experiment 4. We instructed subjects to associate land and water transportations with red and 
green buttons located either up or down relative to the starting hand position. In such a 
context, the task–dictated decision that participants had to make was moving up vs. moving 
down, a decision that can be influenced by the evidence provided by the spatial primes. So, if 
primes were used to gather evidence for the task decision due to source confusion, we would 
indeed expect congruent primes to yield faster response times than incongruent ones. 
One way to tease apart the two competitors left standing after four experiments was to 
prevent any spatial mapping of our instructions. If the task–dictated decision is not spatial in 
nature, there is no way in which spatial primes can inform it. Thus, erroneously gathering 
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evidence from the prime should not affect the decision, nor response times. On the contrary, 
embodied priming would still be possible: Regardless of the decision to be made, as long as 
the response implies an upward or downward movement, primes like ‘up’ and ‘down’ should 
yield facilitation. So, in Experiment 5 we impeded any spatial connotation of the response 
codes by varying the position of the colored buttons on a trial by trial basis, i.e., the red 
button would be the upper button on some trials and the lower button on some others. In 
spatial terms, this means varying the target–key mapping trial by trial, which clearly makes it 
impractical to map responses onto fixed spatial positions. 
In order to maximize the chance of seeing embodied priming, we made target 
classification simpler. This was done because changing the position of the colored button trial 
by trial would clearly make the task more difficult, and thus response times longer; and we 
know that masked semantic priming tends to emerge more clearly (exclusively, in some 
cases) with quick responses (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1996; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). So, in the 
next experiment participants would decide which button to press based on a simple word–
color matching task (Dudshig et al., 2014). 
In the Experiment 5 participants saw color words (yellow and purple)1 as targets, 
appearing on the screen with a yellow and a purple rectangle below and above (see Fig 4). 
They had to press the key (upper, lower) corresponding to the rectangle that matched the 
color word. Importantly, the position of the colored rectangles varied trial by trial, i.e., 
sometimes the yellow was up and the purple down, and sometimes the reverse. 
In this paradigm, targets could no longer be associated with a fixed spatial code (e.g. 
target word – upward movement), but were instead associated with a fixed color code (target 
word – colored rectangle). Thus participants are likely to accumulate evidence to solve the 
																																								 																				
1 We changed the colors from green and red to yellow and purple. The reason for this is that the former 
pair is quite meaningful (red and green consistently signals stop and go, respectively), and we did not want this 
further semantic association to interfere with the semantic processing potentially relevant for priming. Also, red 




task on the basis of the color association. In other words, the decision dictated by the task is 
likely to be “is the word associated with the yellow/purple rectangle?” a decision that is not 
facilitated by the evidence provided by spatial primes (above, below). We believe that this 
procedure minimizes the chance of semantic priming based on Evidence Accumulation and 
Source Confusion. Nevertheless, participants were still required to perform either upward or 
downward movements, which may have been facilitated (Ansorge et al., 2010) or inhibited 





Participants. Thirty-two participants were recruited in this experiment from the same 
population as in previous experiments. Twenty-seven of these participants were females, and 
their mean age was 22. Participants were paid with 8 Euros or given course credits in 
exchange for their time. 
 
Stimuli. The primes were the same Italian spatial words used previously, again divided into 
two groups of four that were rotated across participants in Latin Square design. Target words 
were the two color-names giallo (yellow), and viola (purple). 
 
Apparatus and procedure. Participants were involved in a word–color matching task. They 
were informed that during the experiment they would see a fixation point, followed by a 
string of uppercase letters to signal the arrival of the target, followed in turn by the target 
screen, made up of a color word (either purple or yellow, in white font), and two colored 
rectangles immediately below and above it (see Figure 4). Their task was to press the button 
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on the response box corresponding to the color indicated by the word. 
Because previous experiments had consistently shown that d–prime was comparable 
across different prime–visibility tasks, we only used one in Experiment 5, i.e., the lexical 
decision task where participants judged whether the prime was a real word vs. a string of 
identical uppercase letters. We chose this task because it can be performed on the basis of 
perceptual differences alone, without the need for recognizing the prime word either lexically 
or semantically. So, we gave prime visibility the best possible chance to emerge in the d–
prime values. 
Experiment 5 is identical to previous experiments in all other aspects, with the only 
exception that a few more practice trials were offered to the participants (n=58) in 
consideration of the increased difficulty of the task. 
 
-- Figure 4 about here -- 
 
Results 
Target-response task.  
Data were pre–processed as in previous experiments, leading to the exclusion of 
~10% of trials. The average accuracy rate was ~99% and the overall mean response time was 
757ms. This last figure reveals that response times were slower in this experiment than in 
previous ones, which may jeopardize the chance of seeing a semantic priming effect 
(Ansorge et al., 2010; Greenwald et al., 1996; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). In order to address 
this issue, we will consider response time as a further predictor in our models, so that priming 
can be gauged separately for the fastest 50% and the slowest 50% of RTs (speed was 
modeled as a dichotomous variable based on a subject-wise median split). 
A 2–by–2 ANOVA was run on log–transformed RTs with the factors Congruity 
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(prime congruent with response movement vs. prime incongruent with response movement) 
and Response Speed (fastest 50% bin vs. slowest 50% bin) as predictors. There was no main 
effect of Congruity, F(1,31)= 0.68, p= 0.41, η2= .021, a (trivial) main effect of Response 
Speed, F(1,31)= 907.93, p<0.001, η2= .97, and no Congruity by Response Speed interaction, 
F(1,31)= 1.09, p= .30, η2= .03. Average response times in the congruent and incongruent 
conditions were 758 ms and 756 ms respectively (Figure 5). No effect emerged in the error 
rate analyses. 
 
Prime visibility task.  
As in Experiment 3 and 4, the average d-prime value was low (0.22, SD= 0.34), 
although significantly different from zero (t(31)= 3.72, p< .001). The Greenwald regression 
method (Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995) showed that priming was not significantly 
above or below zero when d–prime was zero (Figure 5). Priming effect and d-prime values 
were not correlated (r= 0.04; t(30)= 0.24, p= 0.81). 
 
-- Figure 5 about here -- 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, we designed the task in order to exclude the possibility that targets 
were transiently associated with a spatial code during the experiment. We achieved that by 
varying the spatial response (upward movement, downward movement) associated with each 
target category on a trial–by–trial basis. This arrangement prevents the emergence of a 
symbolic priming effect based on Evidence Accumulation. Conversely, it maintains the 
possibility that response movements could be directly modulated by the long-term meaning 
of the spatial primes, i.e., embodied, masked semantic priming. Nevertheless, no significant 
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priming effect was observed. 
Before taking these data to show that no embodied semantic representations are 
activated outside awareness, however, we need to demonstrate that the null effect observed 
here is not simply due to the complexity of the task, and that symbolic semantic priming can 
emerge in the same conditions. So, in Experiment 6 we kept the structure of Experiment 5, 
but ruled out the possibility of embodied priming by using non-spatial primes. Target words 
were again two color words, yellow and green, as in Experiment 5. Again identical to the 
previous experiment, these words appeared on the screen together with two symbols located 
above and below them, which indicated the target–key mapping on a trial–by–trial basis. The 
symbols represented males and females, as shown in Figure 6, and participants were asked to 
press the key corresponding to the position of the male symbol when they saw the word 
yellow, and the key corresponding to the position of the female symbol when they saw the 
word green (or vice-versa, counterbalanced across subjects). Primes were non–spatial words 
(man, woman, male, and female) that could be either congruent or incongruent with the trial 
relevant symbol, e.g., prime word is man when participants have to press the button 
corresponding to the male symbol vs. prime word is man when participants have to press the 
button corresponding to the female symbol. 
This paradigm leaves no room for embodied priming. Symbolic priming is instead 
possible according to Evidence Accumulation and Source Confusion. The task–relevant 
hypothesis to gather evidence for is whether going for the male button vs. female button. 
Gender–connoted primes can clearly provide information to address this hypothesis. (Note 
that primes and targets are completely unrelated as in Experiment 4, which allows us to rule 






Participants. Thirty–two participants from the same population as in previous experiments 
were recruited for this study. Twenty-nine of them were females, and their mean age was 23 
years. Participants were paid with 8 Euros or given course credits in exchange for their time. 
 
Stimuli. Four different words connoting gender were used as primes, namely donna 
(woman), femmina (female), uomo (man), and maschio (male). Targets were the two color 
words verde (green), and giallo (yellow). We replaced purple with green because, at least in 
the Italian culture, the former is somewhat connoted for gender, e.g., (light) purple clothes for 
children are typically girl clothes. Target words were presented together with two figures 
representing men and women (see Figure 6). 
 
Apparatus and procedure. In the target response task participants were required to press the 
button on the response box corresponding to the, e.g., male figure if the target word was 
yellow, or female figure if the target word was green. Color–gender association was 
counterbalanced across participants so that half of them paired yellow with male and green 
with female, and half paired yellow with female and green with male. In order to avoid any 
remapping of the task instructions in spatial terms, the figure position varied randomly across 
trials. 
In all other ways, including the trial timeline, the response box, the prime visibility 
task, and the number of trials, Experiment 6 was identical to Experiment 5. 
 






Target-response task. Data were preprocessed as in previous experiments, which led to the 
exclusion of ~10% of trials. The average accuracy rate was ~98% and the overall mean 
response time was 856ms. Because this latter figure reflected the slowest average RT across 
all the experiments, we kept response speed as a covariate in our analyses, as in the previous 
experiment. 
A 2–by–2 ANOVA was run over log–transformed response times with the factors 
Congruity (primes congruent with the response gender vs. primes incongruent with the 
response gender) and Response Speed (quickest 50% of the RTs vs. slowest 50% of the RTs) 
as predictors. This analysis revealed a main effect of Congruity, F(1,31)= 4.22, p= .048, η2= 
.12, a (trivial) main effect of Response Speed, F(1,31)= 511.21, p<.001, η2= .94, and a 
significant Congruity by Response Speed interaction, F(1,31)= 9.70, p= .004, η2= .24. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the congruity effect was highly significant for 
faster RTs (5 ms; F(1,31)= 18.61, p< .001, η2= 0.37), but absent for slower RTs (-1 ms; 
F(1,31)= 0.41, p= .53, η2 = 0.01).  No effect emerged in the error rate analyses. 
These results show a different pattern than the pattern observed in Experiment 5 and 
6. We tested the reliability of this difference by carrying out a cross–experiment analysis. 
Indeed, this revealed a significant Congruity by Experiment interaction, F(1, 62)= 3.89, p= 
0.05, η2= 0.06, and, more critically, a significant Congruity by Response Speed by 
Experiment interaction, F(1, 62)= 7.74, p= 0.007, η2 = 0.11. 
 
Prime visibility task. 
As in Experiments 3–5, the average d-prime value was low (0.40, SD=0.49), but 
significantly different from zero (t(31)= 4.56, p< .001). The Greenwald regression method 
(Greenwald, et al., 1995) revealed that the intercept of the regression was significantly above 
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the origin for data points in the first quantile, indicating a subliminal effect of semantic 
priming with quick RTs (Figure 7a). This effect disappeared when longer latencies (in the 
second quantile) were considered—as shown in Figure 7b, the 95% CI for the priming effect 
includes zero when d–prime is zero. Priming effects did not correlate with d-prime values (all 
r between -0.20 and 0.17,  all t  between -1.10 and 0.89, all p > 0.27). 
 
-- Figure 7 about here -- 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 6, we used the same experimental paradigm as in Experiment 5. 
However, we changed the nature of the prime words (gender words, rather than spatial 
words) and the probes determining the target–button mapping (gender symbols, rather than 
colors) so as to prevent embodied priming, and allow symbolic semantic priming based on 
Evidence Accumulation. The priming effect was highly significant, at least for shorter 
response times (Greenwald, 1996; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000), contrary to what we have found 
in Experiment 5, where embodied priming was allowed and Evidence Accumulation priming 
was prevented. 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
	
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In six experiments we investigated the nature of masked semantic priming using 
words referring to the vertical spatial axis (e.g., up, down). Previous studies showing such an 
effect have claimed that its nature is embodied, i.e., primes yield facilitation by activating 
their corresponding sensorimotor information (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2010; Boulanger et al., 
2006; Dudschig et al., 2014). However, we argued in the Introduction that such a claim 
suffers from at least two fundamental problems: (i) Priming is also open to non–embodied, 
EMBODIED	SEMANTIC	PRIMING	 	 35	
	
fully symbolic interpretations; and (ii) the nature of the putative embodied effect was found 
to be facilitatory in some cases, and inhibitory in others. 
The results of the six experiments uncover the following five facts (see also Table 1): 
(i) At a very short prime duration2 (33ms, in this case) reliable semantic priming emerged 
when a Stimulus-Response Mapping mechanism could take place (e.g. when prime words 
were also used as targets; E1). Yet, spatial words do not yield any priming when Stimulus-
Response Mapping was prevented by using different sets of words as primes and targets (E2), 
although priming could have emerged thanks to symbolic or embodied mechanisms (Ansorge 
te al., 2010; Dudschig et al., 2014). 
(ii) With a slightly longer prime duration, during which primes remain subliminal, a reliable 
semantic priming effect emerged even when any Stimulus-Response mapping was prevented 
(E3). 
(iii) It is not necessary for primes and targets to be semantically related in order to see an 
effect (E4), contrary to the prediction of Spreading Activation mechanisms, but according to 
Evidence Accumulation and Source Confusion and Embodied Priming (EP). 
(iv) When Embodied Priming is the only mechanism by which an effect could arise, there is 
no priming effect (neither facilitatory nor inhibitory; E5). 
(v) When Evidence Accumulation and Source Confusion is the only mechanism by which an 
effect could arise, priming does emerge, and it is facilitatory (E6). 
These results challenge radical theories of Embodied Semantics by showing that there 
is no evidence that unconsciously perceived words activate motor programs solely on the 
basis of their long-term meaning. Critically, this lack of embodied priming is not simply due 
to the fact the masked primes do not reach out to any semantic analysis. If it were so, we 
																																								 																				
2 As acknowledged in the Discussion of Experiment 3, prime presentation time coincides with Stimulus 
Onset Asynchrony (SOA) throughout this paper, so we do not know which factor is most important in 
determining the emergence of the priming effect. This, however, is quite irrelevant from the perspective of the 
main goal of this paper, which is not assessing the role of prime presentation time or SOA, but clarifying 
whether semantic priming is embodied or symbolic in nature.    
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would have failed to observe masked semantic priming overall. Thus, motor activation is not 
an automatic and necessary part of semantic processing, i.e., there is at least one condition 
(lack of awareness) where we see semantic processing, but no sensorimotor activation. 
This conclusion is in line with several behavioral and neuroimaging studies showing 
that embodiment effects fade away under conditions in which task requirements make less 
salient the sensorimotor aspects of stimuli or response codes (Estes, Verges & Barsalou, 
2008; Hoedemaker & Gordon, 2014; Kan, Barsalou, Olseth Solomon, Minor, & Thompson-
Schill, 2003; Lebois, Wilson, Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2014; Niedenthal, Winkielman, 
Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009; Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto, & Tomasino, 2012; Raposo, 
Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009; Rüschemeyer, Brass & Friederici, 2007; Santiago, Ouellet, 
Roman, & Valenzuela, 2012; Thornton, Loetscher, Yates & Nicholls, 2013; Dam, Brazil, 
Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2014). For instance, in one experiment participants judged 
emotional and neutral words while facial electromyographic activity was recorded from the 
cheek, brow, eye, and nose regions (Niedenthal et al., 2009). Results showed emotion-
specific electromyographic activity in an emotion-focused (i.e., semantic judgment), but not 
in a perception-focused (i.e., font judgment) processing task on the same words. Estes et al. 
(2008) asked their participants to engage in a stimulus detection task in which target stimuli 
appeared either at the top or the bottom of a computer screen. The appearance of the target 
was preceded by a word prime in the central fixation denoting objects with typical upper or 
lower location (e.g. hat - boots). They found an effect of interference: Up-related primes 
interfered with the localization of upper targets and down-related primes interfered with the 
localization of lower targets. Crucially, the interference effect faded away when primes were 
masked. Thornton and colleagues (Thornton et al., 2013) also tested whether words 
associated with spatial locations automatically biases behavior toward these locations in 
space. Participants had to classify words (natural vs man-made objects) presented in the 
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center of a computer screen by pressing two keys arranged vertically. As in previous 
experiments upward-related words facilitated upward movements and downward-related 
words facilitated downward movements. Yet, the effect disappeared in a target-detection task 
(similar to Estes et al., 2008) that used the same spatial words as probes, but required only 
one response key. The authors concluded that perceptual biases induced by spatial words is 
due to conflicts during response-selection processes (i.e., the task-dictated decision) more 
than automatic shift of spatial attention or motor activations. 
Likewise, several neuroimaging studies have shown that sensorimotor activations 
during language understanding are context- and task-dependent. For instance reading an 
action verb such as “grasp” does not activate motor or premotor cortices if the verb appears in 
a metaphorical expression (e.g. “to grasp the idea”; Raposo et al., 2009; but see Boulanger et 
al., 2009) or as a part of a morphologically more complex German abstract verbs (a 
comparable example in English would be the word prehending in comprehending). 
Consistently, Kan and colleagues (Kan et al., 2003) showed that, in a property-verification 
task (e.g. “do cats have whiskers?”), the visual association cortex was active only when the 
task was made more difficult and prompted to the use of mental imagery. 
These and other similar results underlie the contextual variability of so-called 
“embodied” effects and, together with the results of this paper, contrast with the hypothesis 
that sensorimotor processes are automatically activated from the early stages of word 
recognition and constitute an intrinsic part of semantic processing. 
 
Comparison with previous masked priming studies 
The hypothesis of highly automatic (Boulanger et al., 2006; Pülvermuller, Hauk, 
Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005) and maybe necessary (Ansorge et al., 2010) sensorimotor 
processing during language understanding has been challenged repeatedly by several studies 
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showing the context- and task-dependency of this motor and sensory activity and its effects. 
However, previous experiments testing ES using unconscious priming paradigms seem to go 
against this tendency. In this paper we reconcile these findings with the extant literature by 
showing that previous instances of Embodied Semantic Priming can be explained also by 
disembodied mechanisms. 
Yet, the results of one study (Dudschig et al. (2014), appear more problematic in this 
regard. In this experiment, masked priming could not be explained on the basis of simple 
stimulus-response mapping, given that primes never appeared as targets. Nevertheless, an 
Evidence Accumulation (fully symbolic) priming mechanism could have accounted for their 
results, since targets could be associated with spatial coordinates due to the fixed response 
code, as in our experiment 4. Although one would predict a positive priming effect as a 
consequence of this mechanism (as we observed in our experiments 4 and 6), Dudschig et al. 
observed a negative semantic priming effect. Dudschig et al. (2014) proposed that whereas 
embodied semantic priming can easily explain a negative priming effect, symbolic priming 
mechanisms cannot. Yet, this claim is not necessarily true. Negative masked semantic 
priming has been already observed in the literature, although its origin is not clear 
(Bermeitinger, Frings, & Wentura, 2008; Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dagenbach, Carr & 
Wilhelmsen, 1989; Wentura & Frings, 2005). For instance, Wentura & Frings (2005) 
reported negative semantic priming for masked words when primes were category names 
(e.g., INSECTS, FLOWERS) and targets category exemplars (e.g., fly, rose). Congruent pairs 
led to longer RTs than incongruent ones, and this effect was stronger for less prototypical, 
exemplars (bed-bug and dahlia) than highly prototypical ones (fly and rose). Likewise, in a 
masked priming experiment with pictures, highly prototypical targets showed positive 
semantic priming, whereas low prototypical targets showed a negative one (Frings, Göbel, 
Mast, Sutter, Bermeitinger, & Wentura 2011). That is, semantically related prime-target pairs 
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with low prototypicality were processed slower compared to unrelated pairs. Although the 
actual mechanisms of negative priming remain debated (but see Frings et al. 2011; Wentura 
& Frings, 2005; for an explanation base on Center-Surround Inhibition) this paradoxical 
effect may explain the results of Dudschig et al. In fact, they used primes that, although 
usually associated with higher or lower positions in space (e.g., castle, mouse), are not 
necessarily highly prototypical members of the semantic categories “UP” and “DOWN”. 
Conversely, in our Experiment 4, primes were words that unambiguously referred to vertical 
spatial positions (e.g. up, down, above, below), and probably connoted very little additional 
semantic features. The difference in prototypicality between the primes used in the two 
experiments may be the reason for the opposite sign of the priming effects observed. In 
Dudschig et al. (2014) the low prototypicality of the primes may have encouraged 
(disembodied) CSI mechanisms to take place (Frings et al. 2011; Wentura & Frings, 2005). 
Not only can the negative priming effect observed by Dudschig et al. be explained (at 
least in principle) by symbolic mechanisms, but the embodied account provided by the 
authors presents several problems. According to them, reverse priming is compatible with 
previous experiments showing that symbols like arrows (e.g., >>) presented subliminally 
inhibit a right/left response to compatible target arrows (>>), and facilitate incompatible 
responses (<<; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). This effect is ascribed to a central mechanism 
that inhibits perceptual-motor links in order to prevent behavior from being affected by 
irrelevant information (Eimer, 1999). Dudschig and colleagues suggested that the same 
mechanism could explain their results with subliminal word primes: Spatial words 
automatically activate congruent motor programs that are immediately inhibited by a central 
control mechanism. Yet, it should be taken into account that the classic result by Eimer and 
colleagues (Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998) is obtained in cases in which the 
same stimuli (e.g., << and  >>) are seen both as targets and primes, with the effect being 
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completely explained at the level of short-term stimulus-response mapping during the 
experiment, independent of semantics (Eimer & Schlaghecken , 1998, Exp. 2 and 3; see also 
Damian, 2001, for a similar account). The fact that the effect is obviously non-semantic 
becomes clear in Eimer & Schlaghecken (1998) Experiment 2. When arrows are used as 
primes, but letters are used as target (LL for left, RR for right), no effect (neither facilitation 
nor inhibition) is found. Thus, given the non-semantic nature of previously reported 
inhibitory effects, comparisons to similar effects based on semantic processing should be 
made cautiously, especially on the basis of Boulanger et al. results (Boulanger et al. 2008; 
discussed in the Introduction), which show that negative masked priming can be obtained 
with meaningless consonant strings. Additionally, an embodied account should predict 
similar negative priming for Ansorge et al.’s experiments and our Experiment 1. In these 
cases the comparison to Eimer & Schlaghecken (1998) is more licensed since the same 
stimuli were used as primes and targets. However, we and Ansorge both observed a positive 
priming effect. The reason of this discrepancy remains elusive. Future studies are needed to 
determine whether negative semantic priming like that observed by Dudschig and colleagues 
is a signature of embodied mechanisms or can be entirely explained in symbolic terms. 
 
Conscious vs. unconscious semantic processing 
Our results suggest that conscious access to word meaning may be necessary to 
observe sensorimotor activations in the context of semantic processing. This does not 
necessarily mean that the involvement of the sensorimotor system observed when words are 
overtly presented is merely a byproduct of the “real” semantic analysis. To date, several 
studies suggest that the sensorimotor system plays an active role in language understanding, 
although it may not be necessary for it (see Willems & Casasanto, 2011, Meteyard et al., 
2014, for approaches that emphasize the functional, but flexible role of the sensorimotor 
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system in language understanding). 
However, our results stand in contrast to what has been called the “elaborate 
processing hypothesis” (Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003), according to which conscious 
and unconscious words undergo the same levels of semantic processing. The data presented 
here suggest otherwise, at least to the extent that unconscious semantic analysis may not 
involve sensory and motor areas that are only active when words are processed consciously. 
Embodied effects associated with language comprehension may be the product of a 
process of integration by which linguistic information (lexical, semantic, syntactic) is 
integrated with non-linguistic information stored in modality-specific or association cortices. 
Although some form of integration can take place outside of awareness (Mudrik, Faivre & 
Koch, 2014; Faivre, Mudrik, Schwartz, & Koch, 2014), several theories suggest that 
consciousness plays a crucial role in combining information coming from different modalities 
and/or cognitive domains (Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Tononi, 2008; Varela, 
Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001), especially when the information to be integrated is 
new or relatively complex (see Mudrik et al., 2014, for a review).  As a consequence, outside 
of awareness, information processing may be confined to highly specialized and segregated 
neural networks (Kouider & Dehaene 2007). The on-line activation of distant non-linguistic 
brain areas such as prefrontal, sensorimotor and association cortices, may be the trademark of 
an integrated construction of word meaning which requires conscious access. 
Importantly, some semantic categories (e.g. emotion words) may be more easily 
integrated with sensorimotor processes than others (Naccacche et al., 2005). For instance, 
there is evidence that emotional words can activate the amygdala even when presented 
subliminally (Nacacche et al., 2005).  That is, categories that have a strong indexical 
relationship with their referents (e.g., they more often co-occur with specific actions or 
sensations) may behave differently than spatial words, and may integrate extra-linguistic 
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information even when unconsciously processed. 
Additionally, future work should test whether, unlike words, pictorial stimuli elicit 
more automatic and unconscious sensorimotor activity. Indeed pictures are iconic, and may 
consistently activate sensorimotor aspects of their referents. Such a comparison may also 
have direct behavioral application, for instance, to decide whether words or images should be 
used to signal dangerous situations that require immediate actions. Further studies are 
warranted to understand the possibilities and limitations of unconscious semantics and to 
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Exp 1 YES YES YES YES 33 ms 19ms *** 
Exp 2 NO YES YES YES 33 ms   2ms 
Exp 3 NO YES YES YES 50 ms 16ms *** 
Exp 4 NO NO YES YES 50 ms   6ms *** 
Exp 5 (Overall) NO NO NO YES 50 ms -2ms 
   fast RTs NO NO NO YES 50 ms -2ms 
   slow RTs NO NO NO YES 50 ms  0ms 
Exp 6 (Overall) NO NO YES NO 50 ms  3ms * 
   fast RTs NO NO YES NO 50 ms  5ms *** 
   slow RTs NO NO YES NO 50 ms -1ms  
	
Note. S-R mapping = Stimulus-Response mapping; EASC = Evidence Accumulation & Source 
Confusion. 




















































































































































































Figure 1. Trial timeline in Experiment 1. 
	
Figure 2. . Regression of priming effect against prime visibility (as assessed though d–prime 
in the prime visibility task) in Experiment 3. Points represent participants, and the shaded 
area indicates the 95% confidence interval of the regression line. Note that priming is 
measured by subtracting mean RTs on congruent trials from mean RTs on incongruent trials, 
that is, positive values indicate facilitation. 
	
Figure 3. Regression of priming effect against prime visibility (as assessed though d–prime in 
the prime visibility task) in Experiment 4. Points represent participants, and the shaded area 
indicates the 95% confidence interval of the regression line. Note that priming is measured by 
subtracting mean RTs on congruent trials from mean RTs on incongruent trials, that is, 
positive values indicate facilitation.	
	
Figure 4. Trial timeline in Experiment 5. 
	
Figure 5. Regression of the priming effect against prime visibility (as assessed though d–
prime in the prime visibility task) in Experiment 5. Points represent participants, and the 
shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval of the regression line. Note that priming is 
measured by subtracting mean RTs on congruent trials from mean RTs on incongruent trials, 




Figure 6. Trial timeline in Experiment 6.	
	
Figure 7. Regression of priming effect against prime visibility (as assessed though d–prime in 
the prime visibility task) in Experiment 6, computed separately for quick RTs (panel a) and 
slow RTs (panel b). Points represent participants, and the shaded area indicates the 95% 
confidence interval of the regression line. Note that priming is measured by subtracting mean 
RTs on congruent trials from mean RTs on incongruent trials, that is, positive values indicate 
facilitation. 
 
 
	
 
